Breaking the Age Barrier in Alaska: Including Adult Children in Loss of Filial Consortium Actions by Hammar, Julian E.
NOTES
Breaking the Age Barrier in Alaska:
Including Adult Children in Loss of
Filial Consortium Actions
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized causes of action for
loss of filial consortium in personal injury cases involving minor
children. This note will argue that loss offilial consortium actions
should be extended to include adult children because such an
extension would be consistent with the modem legal understanding
of loss of consortium. Including adult children in the child's
cause of action poses no problem as a matter of common law
interpretation. However, including adult children in the parent's
cause of action is problematic because the court recognized the
parent's claim on the basis of Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010,
which permits recovery only for injured minor children. This note
will argue that section 09.15.010 is the wrong foundation on which
to base the parents' claim, but if the court adheres to this basis,
this note will argue that section 09.15.010 should be held unconsti-
tutional on equal protection grounds.
I. INTRODUCrION
In recent years, the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized
causes of action for tortious interference with the parent-child
relationship, or loss of filial consortium. In Hibpshman v.
Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc.,2 the court created a minor child's
Copyright © 1995 by Alaska Law Review
1. Consortium in the parent-child context has been variously defined.
Generally, it has been said to include such intangibles as love, affection, comfort,
companionship, society and solace. In the case of the child suing for loss of a
parent's consortium, it also includes guidance, protection and loss of a role model.
See Jean C. Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss
of an Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. Li. 590, 616-17 (1976).
2. 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987).
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independent cause of action for loss of parental consortium
resulting from injuries tortiously inflicted on the child's parent.
Subsequently, in Gillispie v. Beta Construction Co.,3 the court
determined that Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010 permits parents
to maintain a cause of action for loss of their minor child's society
resulting from the child's death or injury tortiously inflicted by a
third person.
These Alaska decisions are part of a national trend. Currently,
sixteen states recognize the child's cause of action, eight more than
when the Alaska Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Hibpshman.4 The parent's cause of action is recognized by fifteen
states.5 However, states recognizing one cause of action do not
3. 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992).
4. Those states, including Alaska, are the following: Arizona, Villareal v.
Arizona Dept. of Transp., 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1989); Florida, FLA. ST. ANN.
§ 768.0415 (West Supp. 1995); Iowa, Audobon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois
Cent. Gulf R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983); Louisiana, Horton v. McCrary, 620
So.2d 918 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Massachusetts, Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons,
413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980); Michigan, Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich.
1981); Montana, Keele v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 852 P.2d 574
(Mont. 1993); Ohio, Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052
(Ohio 1993); Oklahoma, Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1990); Texas,
Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1991); Vermont, Hay v. Medical Ctr.
Hosp., 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985); Washington, Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691
P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984); West Virginia, Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va.
1990); Wisconsin, Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984); and
Wyoming, Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County, 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990).
5. In addition to Alaska, those states are: Arizona, Howard Frank, M.D.,
P.C. v. Superior Ct., 722 P.2d 955 (Ariz. 1986); Florida, United States v. Dempsey,
635 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1994); Hawaii, Masaki v. General Motors, 780 P.2d 566 (Haw.
1989); Iowa, IowA R. CIV. P. 8; Idaho, Hayward v. Yost, 242 P.2d 971 (Idaho
1952); Louisiana, Pino v. Gauthier, 633 So. 2d 638 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Massachu-
setts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85X (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); New Jersey,
Davis v. Elizabeth Gen. Medical Ctr., 548 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1988); North Dakota, Jacobs v. Anderson Bldg. Co., 430 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1988);
Ohio, Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio 1993);
Rhode Island, Jameson v. Hawthorne, 635 A.2d 1167 (R.I. 1994); Texas, Enochs
v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.24.010 (West 1988); and Wisconsin, Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495
(Wis. 1975). The courts in Illinois are divided: Compare Barkei v. Delnor Hosp.,
531 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (no cause of action) with Dymek v. Nyquist,
469 N.E.2d 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (cause of action).
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necessarily acknowledge the other. Moreover, a small majority of
states still do not recognize filial consortium actions.6
Alaska's recognition of filial consortium claims represents a
humane approach to the law. It compensates parents and minor
children for the real losses they suffer as a result of the injury to
such relationships. This note will argue that the Alaska Supreme
Court should take this approach one step further by extending both
causes of action to include adult children.
When the Alaska Supreme Court recognized the causes of
action for loss of filial consortium, it limited its holdings to minor
children. However, in both cases, these were the facts before the
court. Thus, the limitation can and should be construed in light of
6. Twenty-two states have rejected a child's cause of action for loss of
parental consortium as a result of negligent injury. See Patterson v. Hays, 623 So.
2d 1142 (Ala. 1993); Gray v. Suggs, 728 S.W.2d 148 (Ark. 1987); Borer v. Am.
Airlines, 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977); Lee v. Colorado Dept. of Health, 718 P.2d 221
(Colo. 1986); Williams v. Picard, 1993 WL 7599 (Conn. Super. Ct., Jan. 7, 1993);
Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471 (D.C. Cir. 1958); W. J.
Bremer Co. v. Graham, 312 S.E.2d 806 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Van de Veire v.
Sears, 533 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Dearborn Fabricating & Eng'g Corp.
v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135 (Ind. 1990); Schneck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d
1263 (Kan. 1982); Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264 (Me. 1987); Monias v. Endal,
623 A.2d 656 (Md. 1993); Salin v. Kloempken, 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982);
Barbera v. Brod-Dugan Co., 770 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Guenther v.
Stollberg, 495 N.W.2d 286 (Neb. 1993); General Electric v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366
(Nev. 1972); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1972); DeAngelis
v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406 (N.Y. 1983); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 376
S.E.2d 236 (N.C. 1989); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1980); Norwest
v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318 (Or. 1982); Steiner v. Bell Tel.
Co., 517 A.2d 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Still v. Baptist Hosp., 755 S.W.2d 807
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
Sixteen states have rejected a parent's cause of action for loss of a child's
consortium resulting from negligent injury. See Baxter v. Superior Court., 563
P.2d 871 (Cal. 1977); Mahoney v. Lensink, 550 A.2d 1088 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988);
Wheeler v. Drummond, 1990 WL 58253 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 1990); District
of Columbia v. Howell, 607 A.2d 501 (D.C. 1992); McKee v. Humana of Ky., Inc.,
834 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); Monias v. Endal, 623 A.2d 656 (Md. 1993);
Sizemore v. Smock, 422 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. 1988); Powell v. American Motors
Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1992); Heidt v. Heidt, 842 P.2d 723 (Nev. 1992);
Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19 (N.H. 1984); Wilson v. Galt, 668
P.2d 1104 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery, 67 N.E.2d 155 (N.Y.
1946); Beerbower v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 736 P.2d 596 (Or. Ct. App.
1987); Brower v. City of Philadelphia, 557 A.2d 48 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989);
Boucher v. Dixie Medical Ctr., 850 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1992); Gates v. Richardson,
719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).
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the common law practice of limiting holdings to the specific facts
of the case under consideration. Therefore, when the appropriate
case arises, these causes of action should be extended to adult
children.
The parent-child relationship does not end when the child
becomes eighteen. It endures throughout life and can be character-
ized by love, care and affection for the duration. The Iowa
Supreme Court recognized this reality when, in Audobon-Exira
Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Central & Gulf Railroad,7 it refused to
limit the award of loss of parental consortium damages to children
still in their minority. The court stated that "'[e]ven adult and
married children have the right to expect the benefit of good
parental advice and guidance."' 8
The most viable legal argument against extending loss of filial
consortium damages to adult children is that the mutual obligation
of support and obedience between parents and children terminates
when the child reaches the age of majority. Parents cannot expect
to recover for injury to their adult children because their legal
entitlement to the child's obedience and services no longer exists
when the child reaches eighteen. Similarly, because children can
expect to be supported by their parents only until their majority,
damages for a parent's injury should be awarded only up to that
point and no further.
This argument flies in the face of common law developments
in the loss of consortium area. In particular, it fails to recognize
the historical development of consortium damages away from the
old loss of services definition toward one based on loss of society
and companionship. Before fully developing this point, it will first
be necessary to trace the historical evolution of loss of consortium
actions at common law in general and under Alaska law specifical-
ly.
Part II of this note will analyze this evolution and demonstrate
that barring loss of filial consortium claims for adult children is
logically inconsistent with the changed legal conception of consor-
tium damages. Part III will first utilize social scientific studies to
demonstrate the enduring nature of the parent-child relationship
into the child's adulthood. The note will then analyze authorities
7. 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983).
8. Id. at 152 (quoting Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, 170 N.W.2d 632, 665
(Iowa 1969)).
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from states that have granted coverage to adult children. This
analysis will be followed by an examination of Alaska's wrongful
death statute, which imposes no age restriction on those who may
sue for wrongful death damages. Arguments against extending the
causes of action to adults will then be assessed and refuted.
Finally, Part IV will offer specific recommendations to the Alaska
Supreme Court in the loss of filial consortium area.
II. HISTORY OF Loss OF CONSORTIUM
A. Common Law Developments
The trend in the states towards recognition of the loss of filial
consortium causes of action represents a fundamental reconcep-
tualization of the legal understanding of the parent-child relation-
ship. At common law, the father (and only the father) could
recover damages based on lost services and potential earnings when
his child was injured. The father's relationship with the child was
likened to that existing between master and servant. The common
law had long recognized that the master could sue for loss of a
servant's services when the servant was tortiously injured. Thus,
children were considered by the law to be mere economic assets,
as evidenced by the father's damages being limited to pecuniary
losses.9
The relationship between husband and wife was similarly
regarded. The husband could sue for the loss of his wife's services,
per quod consortium amisit.1 Gradually, however, the husband
9. See Michael B. Victorson, Note, Torts-Parent's Recovery for Loss of
Society and Companionship of Child, 80 W. VA. L. REv. 340, 341 (1978) (quoting
McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted Mills, 53 A. 320, 325-26 (1902)). The
court in McGarr stated:
[T]he proper measure of damages is the pecuniary value of the child's
services from the time of the injury until it attains its majority... [.] In
short, the measure of damages in such a case is the same as that which
obtains in a case brought by a master for the loss of services of his
servant or apprentice. It is therefore practically a business and commer-
cial question only, and the elements of affection and sentiment have no
place therein.
McGarr, 53 A. at 325-26.
10. "[W]hereby he lost the company [of his wife]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1141 (6th ed. 1990). An early case that recognized this cause of action was Guy
v. Livesay, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1619); see Michael A. Mogill, And Justice for Some:
Assessing the Need to Recognize the Child's Action for Loss of Parental Consor-
tium, 24 AIuz. ST. L.J. 1321, 1328 n.39 (1992).
1995]
78 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:1
was able to recover for loss of sexual attentions, society and
affection under the rubric of the consortium action." The wife
had no reciprocal cause of action for loss of her husband's
consortium because she had no entitlement to her husband's
services. Moreover, only the husband could bring a claim for
loss of consortium because the wife had no legal identity at
common law. This situation was not ameliorated by the passage of
the Married Women's Acts in the nineteenth century, which gave
married women legal status. Women gained the capacity to sue
from these acts but not the right to sue for consortium damages. 13
Not until 1950 did a court hold that a wife could sue for loss of her
husband's consortium caused by negligent injury.4
Today, the overwhelming majority of states permit wives to sue
for loss of consortium." Allowing wives to sue shifted the focus
11. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 125, at 931 (5th ed. 1984).
12. Id. Blackstone stated with regard to the husband-wife relationship:
We may observe, that in these relative injuries, notice is only taken of
the wrong done to the superior of the parties related by the breach and
dissolution of either the relation, itself, or, at least, the advantages
accruing therefrom; while the loss of the inferior, by such injuries, is
totally unregarded. One reason for which may be this: that the inferior
hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the
superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior: and,
therefore, the inferior, can suffer no loss or injury. The wife cannot
recover damages ... for she hath no separate interest in any thing,
during her coverture.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 143
(1758).
13. GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & JAMES E. MEEKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 765-66 (2d ed. 1990).
14. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); see KEETON, supra
note 11, § 125 at 931-32.
15. The wife's right of recovery for loss of consortium from the negligent
injury of her husband is recognized by Alaska and 45 other states and the District
of Columbia. See Williams v. Alabama Neon Sign Co., 304 So. 2d 895 (Ala. 1974);
Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 503
P.2d 803 (Ariz. 1972); Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir.
1982) (applying Arkansas law); Pesce v. Summa Corp., 126 Cal. Rptr. 451 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975); Lee v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221 (Colo. 1986); Hopson
v. St. Mary's Hosp., 408 A.2d 260 (Conn. 1979); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 484
A.2d 527 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984); Romer v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097
(D.C. 1982); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Smith v. Tri-State Culvert
Mfg. Co. 191 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Yamamoto v. Premier Ins. Co., 668
P.2d 42 (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 519 P.2d 421 (Idaho 1974);
Kolar v. City of Chicago, 299 N.E.2d 479 (Il1 App. Ct. 1973); Troue v. Marker, 252
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of consortium damages away from loss of services, based on the
servile status of the wife at common law, to loss of companionship,
comfort, love, solace and the like, as well as sexual relations. 6 In
fact, according to one commentator: "it is arguable whether
'services' remain a part of consortium at all."'7
Children were placed in a position similar to the wife's at
common law, as they had no entitlement to their parents' services
and could not recover for loss of society damages. This situation
was condemned by noted commentators. As early as 1916, Dean
Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School wrote:
As against the world at large a child has an interest... in
the society and affection of the parent ... . But the law has
done little to secure these interests. At common law there are
no legal rights which protect them.
N.E.2d 800 (Ind. 1969); Childers v. McGee, 306 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 1981); Kotsiris
v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 19, § 167-A (West
1981); Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 231 A.2d 514 (Md. 1967); Olsen v. Bell Tel.
Lab., Inc., 445 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1983); Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227
(Mich. 1960); Dawydowycz v. Quady, 220 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1974); Tribble v.
Gregory, 288 So. 2d 13 (Miss. 1974); Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365
S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Johnson v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 597 (D. Mont.
1980) (applying Montana law); Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1958)
(applying Nebraska law); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1972);
New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Bisson, 449 A.2d 1226 (N.H. 1982); Ekalo v.
Constructive Serv. Corp., 215 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1965); Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840
(N.M. 1994); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968);
Nicholson v. Hugh Catham Memorial Hosp., 266 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1980); Hastings
v. James River Aerie No. 2337, 246 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1976); Clouston v.
Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 258 N.E.2d 230 (Ohio 1970); Middlebrook
v. Imler, Tenny & Kugler, Inc., 713 P.2d 572 (Okla. 1985); Snodgrass v. Gen. Tel.
Co., 549 P.2d 1120 (Or. 1976); Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974);
Mariani v. Nanni, 185 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1962); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-75-20 (Law Co-
op 1976); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669 (S.D. 1959); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 25-1-106 (1980); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978); Whitney v.
Fisher, 417 A.2d 934 (Vt. 1980); Lundgren v. Whitney's Inc., 614 P.2d 1272 (Wash.
1980); King v. Bittinger, 231 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va. 1976); Peeples v. Sargent, 253
N.W.2d 459 (Wis. 1977); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986).
A small minority of states, however, achieved equality between the spouses
by abolishing the husband's cause of action. See, e.g., Hackford v. Utah Power &
Light, 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987).
16. David P. Dwork, Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of A Parent's
Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.
L. REV. 722, 726-27 (1976).
17. See Mogill, supra note 10, at 1328.
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It will have been observed that legal securing of the
interests of children falls far short of what general considerations
would appear to demand. 8
However, judges and the courts were slow to react to this apparent
shortfall.
Nevertheless, with the changed definition of consortium
between husband and wife, some courts began to change their
conception of consortium in the parent-child relationship. The
similarity between these relationships prompted these courts to
recognize filial consortium claims. Defendants raised the objection,
successful with some courts, that the parent-child relationship was
fundamentally different from that between husband and wife and
should be treated accordingly. These defendants based this
objection on the presence of a sexual component in the husband-
wife relationship that was absent from the parent-child relationship.
However, the Michigan Supreme Court in Berger v. Weber, 9 a
leading case in this area, effectively answered that objection:
"Sexual relations are but one element of the spouse's consortium
action. The other elements-love, companionship, affection,
society, comfort, services and solace-are similar in both relation-
ships and in each are deserving of protection."'2
Similarly, some courts recognized that compensating parents
and children for loss of society and companionship more accurately
compensates them for the losses they suffer. These courts
recognized that loss of a child's services no longer represented the
major component of the parents' loss. For example, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Shockley v. Prier2 stated that "[iun the majority
of family situations, children are no longer an economic asset...
,"' As a result, "[t]he 'remedy' of loss of [a] minor's earning
capacity during minority is of diminishing significance.... Society
and companionship between parents and their children are closer
to our present day family ideal than the right of the parents to the
'earning capacity during minority'...
The recognition of loss of companionship and society in the
filial relationship began in the wrongful death area. Many state
18. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L.
REv. 177, 185-86 (1916) (footnote omitted).
19. 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981)
20. Id at 426.
21. 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
22. Id. at 498.
23. Id. at 499.
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legislatures amended their wrongful death acts24 to include
recovery for consortium damages where the victim suffers death.
Currently, twenty-four states have done so, including Alaska. In
addition, courts in fourteen states liberally construed their wrongful
death statutes to include filial consortium damages, even though
these statutes traditionally had been interpreted to limit recovery
to pecuniary loss.'
The next step was to extend loss of filial consortium recovery
to negligent injury cases. At first, courts made this extension only
in the case of serious, permanent injury. The rationale was that
death and severe injury are often only separated by a mere
fortuity Some courts expressly recognized, however, that the
24. Wrongful Death Acts refer to statutes that confer a cause of action for
designated survivors of a tort victim who is killed. At common law, civil actions
against a tortfeasor died with the victim. The wrongdoer was only liable for
nonfatal injuries. Consequently, he was better off if the victim was killed rather
than injured. This anomalous situation was changed when Lord Campbell's Act
was passed in England in 1846. Most states' statutes are modelled on this act. See
KEETON, supra note 11, § 127 at 945.
25. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 and 09.15.010 (1994); ARK. CODE AmN. § 16-
62-102 (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West 1986); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 663.3 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.135 (Baldwin 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2315 (West 1984); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (West 1991); MD. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d) (1989);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 1985); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 27A.2922 (West 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.090 (Vernon 1988); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41.085(4) (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (Supp. 1994); OHnO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2125-02 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1055 (West
1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.020 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-7-1.2 (1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492(b) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-01.52 (1981); WASH.
REv. CODE § 4.24.010 (1989); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.04 (West 1983); WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102 (1988).
26. See City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 466 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1970); Krouse v.
Graham, 562 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1977); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982);
Elliot v. Willis, 412 N.E.2d 638 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); American Car Loading Corp.
v. Gary Trust & Say. Bank, 25 N.E.2d 777 (Ind. 1940); Marceleno v. State Dep't
of Highways, 367 So. 2d 882 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Fussner v. Andert, 113 N.W.2d
355 (Minn. 1961); Bouroughs v. Oliver, 85 So. 2d 191 (Miss. 1956); Swanson v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 646 P.2d 1166 (Mont. 1982); Garwin v. Coover, 276 N.W.2d
225 (Neb. 1979); Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210 (N.J. 1980); Nance v. State Bd.
of Educ., 282 S.E.2d 848 (S.C. 1981); Anderson v. Lele, 216 N.W.2d 152 (S.D.
1974); Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982). See generally Mogill, supra note
10, at 1336.
27. See, e.g., Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Ct., 722 P.2d 955, 957
(Ariz. 1986); Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985); Ueland v.
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degree of injury goes to the element of damages and not to
whether recovery for filial consortium should be allowed.'
B. Developments in Alaska Law
Alaska law paralleled these common law reforms and, indeed,
formed part of the avant garde in their formulation. In Schreiner
v. Fruit,29 a 1974 decision, the Alaska Supreme Court first adopted
a wife's right to sue for loss of consortium damages resulting from
injury to her husband. The court clearly recognized the conceptual
shift in computing damages in consortium actions away from
services toward sentimental interests:
The interest to be protected [in loss of consortium actions] is
personal to the wife, for she suffers a loss of her own when the
care, comfort, companionship, and solace of her spouse is denied
her. The basis for recovery is no longer the loss of services, but
rather the injury to the conjugal relation?'
Subsequently, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted the minor
child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium in Hibpshman
v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc.31 The court pointed to the similarity
between the child's cause of action and spousal consortium claims.
It also cited Alaska's wrongful death statute, which provides for
recovery by children for loss of consortium damages in wrongful
death cases.32  The court determined that "[p]recluding minor
children from maintaining a cause of action for loss of parental
consortium arising from their parent's injury would, in our view, be
inconsistent with the legislature's authorization of such recovery
when the parent dies .... ."' Based on this determination, the
court concluded that "[t]he claim for loss of parental consortium
presented in this case is not sufficiently distinguishable from either
Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 192 (Wash. 1984); Berger v. Weber, 303
N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. 1981); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413
N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980).
28. The Alaska Supreme Court recognized this in Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay
Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 994 n.10 (Alaska 1987); see infra text accompanying
notes 31-34.
29. 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974).
30. Id. at 465-66.
31. 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987).
32. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.580(c)(4) (1994).
33. Hibpshman, 734 P.2d at 994.
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spousal consortium claims in injury cases or children's consortium
claims in death cases to warrant non-recognition. ''
Not long after the Hibpshman decision, the Alaska Supreme
Court recognized parents' causes of action for loss of a negligently
injured minor child's consortium in Gillispie v. Beta Construction
Co.3 Here the court's reasoning deviated from common law
developments in the loss of filial consortium area. The problem
was that Alaska's wrongful death statute did not (and currently
does not) provide for individual recovery by a non-dependent
parent for loss of a child's consortium. 6
Rather than interpreting the common law as creating the cause
of action, the court based its decision on Alaska Statutes section
09.15.010, which provides in pertinent part: "A parent may
maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a child
below the age of majority."'37  The statute apparently had its
origins in a nineteenth century Oregon law that permitted parents
to sue when their child was tortiously injured." The court noted
that the Oregon statute was deeply rooted in the master-servant
view of the filial relationship and had been interpreted to limit
recovery to pecuniary losses.39 However, the court, recognizing
the changed nature of consortium damages, permitted the parents
to recover for loss of the minor child's society.' Then Chief
Justice Rabinowitz, concurring in the result, would have extended
the cause of action as logically following from the court's decisions
34. Id. In addition to Schreiner, the court cited its decisions in Cramer v.
Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963) and Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967)
in which it rejected the doctrines of interspousal and parental immunity,
respectively, in the context of negligence-based injury claims.
35. 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992).
36. The decedent's estate recovers the wrongful death damages. Such damages
are limited to pecuniary losses and are distributed as other personal property of
the deceased. See In re Estate of Pushruk, 562 P.2d 329 (Alaska 1977).
37. ALASKA STAT. § 09.15.010 (1994).
38. Large portions of Alaska's first civil code, enacted by Congress in 1900,
were drawn verbatim from Oregon statutes. This included the predecessor of
section 09.15.010. Therefore, the court interpreted the statute on the basis of early
Oregon precedents. Gillispie, 842 P.2d at 1273 (citing City of Fairbanks v.
Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 208 (Alaska 1962) ("[I]t is presumed that [the statutes
were] adopted with the interpretation that had been placed upon [them] by the
Oregon Supreme Court prior to 1900.")).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1273-74.
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in Schreiner and Hibpshman rather than from section 09.15.010.41
He would have further held that the state's wrongful death statute
does not preclude recognition of the parent's loss of consortium
claim under the common law of Alaska.42
Both the Hibpshman and Gillispie decisions limited their
holdings to minor children. However, in a different context
involving the parent-child relationship, the Alaska Supreme Court
chose not to impose an age limitation. In Tommy's Elbow Room
v. Kavorkian,43 the court held that a parent bystander may
maintain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress caused by injury to the parent's child. The court did not
restrict the action to minor children, and indeed the age of the
victim in the case itself was not discussed.
C. Extending Filial Consortium to Adult Children
Extending the cause of action for loss of filial consortium to
adult children logically follows from the historical development
outlined above. The rejection by the Alaska Supreme Court and
other courts of the services theory in favor of a society, care and
companionship theory in loss of filial consortium cases eviscerates
the legitimacy of an arbitrary age cutoff. Such a cutoff is justifi-
able under a services theory because the service obligation between
parents and children can be expected to terminate when the child
reaches the age of majority. However, this is not the case with
society, care and companionship. Parents and children can
reasonably expect to enjoy these benefits throughout their lives.
Accordingly, to reject services as the compensable element in loss
of consortium cases in favor of society, care and companionship,
and yet deny compensation for adult children, is fundamentally
inconsistent. Likewise, it is inconsistent to permit a parent to
recover negligent infliction of emotional distress damages for an
injured adult child while not permitting that same parent to sue for
loss of the adult child's consortium. The next section of this note
focuses on authorities and evidence that support breaking the age
barrier to extend loss of filial consortium claims to adult children.
41. IdM at 1274-75 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring); see also Scott v. United
States, 884 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1989).
42. Gillispie, 842 P.2d at 1275 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring).
43. 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1986).
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III. BREAKING THE AGE BARRIER
There are ample social scientific justifications for allowing
adult children to recover for loss of consortium. Following an
analysis of those justifications in section A of Part III, section B
will set forth the states that have already extended the cause of
action to adult children. Section C will then turn to an examination
of Alaska's wrongful death statute and its application to this area
of the law. Section D will consider and refute arguments against
extending the cause of action.
A. Social Scientific Literature
The damages suffered by adult children and their parents when
either an adult child or parent is injured are not illusory. A
preponderance of the social scientific literature has concluded that
the parent-child relationship remains important into the child's
adulthood. In many cases, contact between parents and adult
children is frequent. According to one study, over fifty percent of
older parents saw one of their adult children either on the day they
were interviewed or on the previous day.4 Three-quarters of the
parents surveyed had seen their adult children within the last
week.45
Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that adult
children remain of considerable importance in the lives of their
parents.' Similarly, several studies have demonstrated the
importance of parents in the lives of adult children. In one study,
even the oldest members of the sample of adult children stated that
they looked to their parents for guidance more than they looked to
other people.47 One researcher has asserted that the importance
of the parent-child relationship increases as the child ages.'
44. E. Shanas, Older People and Their Families: The New Pioneers, 42 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 9,12 (1980).
45. Id.
46. For a summary of this research, see Evan T. Peterson, Elderly Parents and
Their Offspring, in AGING AND THE FAMILY 175, 179 (Stephen J. Bahr & Evan
T. Peterson eds., 1989).
47. Id.
48. Timothy D. Ament, Parents' Loss of Consortium Claims for Adult Children
in Iowa: The Magical Age of Eighteen, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 247,259 (1992) (citing
Victor G. Circirelli, Adult Children and Their Elderly Parents, in FAMILY
RELATIONS LATER IN LIFE 31, 34 (T. Brubaker ed., 1st ed. 1983)).
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Another study traced the relationship over time and found that the
parent-child relationship is characterized by high dependency
during young childhood, low dependency during adolescence, but
increased dependency during young adulthood and middle-age.49
That the relationship should increase in importance comports with
common sense: the adult child's relationship with the parent is
longer and characterized by more shared experiences than a
younger child's.
The adverse consequences for minor children when they
experience the loss of a parent's society has been well documented.
Minor children who have been denied a parent's consortium due to
illness or injury have been found to have higher rates of illness,
higher rates of juvenile delinquency and a higher occurrence of
psychiatric disorder." A variety of other short-term and long-
term effects have been noted, including separation anxiety,
depression, substance abuse and suicidal tendencies.5'
Although the impact on adult children of the loss of a parent's
society is less well documented, a recent study indicates that the
death of a parent after the child has reached adulthood can have
adverse effects on this child in many cases.52 The researchers
compared a sample of adults who had lost a parent with a sample
that had not. They found that the bereaved adult children
experienced "a significant increase in psychological distress and
alcohol consumption and a decline in physical health status."53 It
can easily be inferred from this finding that similar consequences
would result in the case of a parent who is negligently injured.
49. Robert A. Lewis, The Adult Child and Older Parents, in FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS IN LATER LIFE 68, 73-78 (T. Brubaker ed., 2d ed. 1990).
50. Michael Rutter, CHILDREN OF SICK PARENTS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PSYCHIATRIC STUDY 13-16 (1966); see also Bernard L. Berelson & Gary A.
Steiner, HUMAN BEHAVIOR: AN INVENTORY OF SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS 316-17
(1964); Judith Stillion & Hannelore Wass, Children and Death, in DEATH:
CURRENT PERSPECriVES 225 (E.S. Schneidman ed., 3d ed. 1984).
51. See generally Claudia L. Jewett, HELPING CHILDREN COPE WITH
SEPARATION AND Loss 22 (1982); see also Marian Osterweis & Jessica Townsend,
UNDERSTANDING BEREAVEMENT REACTIONS IN ADULTS AND CHILDREN 18
(1989); Arnold Samuels, Parental Death in Childhood, in CHILDHOOD BEREAVE-
MENT AND ITS AFrERMATH 19, 22 (Sol Altschul ed., 1988).
52. Debra Umberson & Meichu D. Chen, Effects of a Parent's Death on Adult
Children: Relationship Salience and Reaction to Loss, 59 AM. Soc. REV. 152
(1994).
53. Id at 152.
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The impact on parents of injuries to their adult children also
has not been extensively examined. Nevertheless, a researcher
from the University of Wisconsin has assessed the impact on
parents of "major problems and strains" in the lives of their
middle-aged children.' The problems and strains considered
included divorce, long-term unemployment, health problems,
alcohol or drug dependency, emotional problems and financial
difficulties.55 The study found that for mothers, but not for
fathers, there was a significant relationship between those problems
and the parents' emotional well-being.56  In the qualitative
interviews that followed, however, the fathers reported experienc-
ing considerable personal distress as a result of their middle-aged
children's problems.5 Because parents' emotional and mental
well-being can be so closely tied to the health and success of their
adult child, negligent injury of that child will have a profound
impact on the mental vitality of elderly parents.
B. Case Law From Other States
Contrary to sound reasoning, a large number of courts that
have recognized filial consortium claims have limited them to minor
children." The claims have been limited even though these courts
54. Jan R. Greenberg, Problems in the Lives of Adult Children: Their Impact
on Aging Parents, 16 J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 149 (1991).
55. Id. at 153.
56. Id. at 154.
57. Id. at 155.
58. Courts have limited the child's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium to minors in the following cases: Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply,
Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987); Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413
N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980) (limited to dependents); Pence v. Fox, 813 P.2d 429
(Mont. 1991); Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052 (Ohio
1993); Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vermont, 496 A.2d 939 (Vt. 1985); Belcher
v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1990); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d
513 (Wis. 1984); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County. Joint Powers Bd., 797 P.2d
1171 (Wyo. 1990). Florida has limited the cause of action to minors by statute.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.0415 (West 1995).
The parent's cause of action for loss of an injured child's consortium has been
limited to minors in the following cases: Gillispie v. Beta Construction Co., 842
P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992); Davis v. Elizabeth Gen. Medical Ctr., 548 A.2d 528 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988); Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d
1052 (Ohio 1993); Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
Iowa has the anomalous situation where adult children may sue for loss of a
parent's consortium, but parents may not sue for loss of an adult child's
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have recognized that the master-servant analogy is no longer
applicable to the parent-child relationship. For example, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Shockley v. Prier9 that
"today's relationship between parents and children is, or should be,
more than that between master and servant,"'  but the court
nevertheless limited its holding to minor children. In Shockley and
similar cases, however, minor children were before the court. As
noted earlier with the Alaska decisions, these cases may simply
reflect the common law practice of limiting holdings to specific
facts. Only a few courts have explicitly refused to extend the cause
of action to adult children when faced with such facts.61
A number of courts have taken the logical next step and
recognized that filial consortium claims should cover adult
children.62 The Arizona Supreme Court, in Howard Frank, M.D.,
PC. v. Superior Court,6' refused to limit a parent's loss of consor-
tium action to minor children where an adult child suffered brain
damage as a result of the negligent administration of anesthesia
during surgery. The court stated that the "master-servant analogy
is clearly antiquated and long overdue for judicial burial."' , It
noted, however, that filial consortium actions "continue to be
haunted by the common law master-servant rationale," citing the
reluctance of states to extend these actions to adult children. 65
The court rejected a pecuniary services theory for loss of a child's
consortium, finding that "'the true significance of a parent's action
under modem practice is that it compensates the parents' emotion-
consortium. See Loftsgard v. Dorrian, 476 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
59. 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
60. Id. at 500.
61. See, e.g., Loftsgard v. Dorrian, 476 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
62. Two courts have permitted a parent to sue for loss of consortium of their
adult child. See Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955 (Ariz.
1986); Masaki v. General Motors, 780 P.2d 566 (Hawaii 1989).
Four courts have permitted an adult child to sue for loss of parental
consortium. See Villareal v. Dept. of Transp. of Arizona, 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz.
1989); Audobon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148
(Iowa 1983); Reagan v., Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1991); Ueland v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984).
63. 722 P.2d 955 (Ariz. 1986).
64. Id. at 960.
65. Id. at 959-60.
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al losses when their child is injured."'" With regard to an age
limitation, the court stated:
It is irrelevant that parents are not entitled to the services of
their adult children; they continue to enjoy a legitimate and
protectible expectation of consortium beyond majority arising
from the very bonds of the family relationship. Surely nature
recoils from the suggestion that the society, companionship and
love which compose filial consortium automatically fade upon
emancipation .... The filial relationship, admittedly intangible,
is ill-defined by reference to the ages of the parties and ill-served
by arbitrary age distinctions.67
The Arizona court, further noted that "to suggest as a matter
of law that compensable consortium begins at birth and ends at age
eighteen is illogical and inconsistent with common sense and
experience." ' Moreover, it found no age restriction in Arizona's
wrongful death statute.69 The court concluded that "we can find
no reason for limiting the class of plaintiffs to parents of minor
children when the parents of adult children may suffer equal or
greater harm.,
70
In Masaki v. General Motors Corp.,7' the Hawaii Supreme
Court likewise rejected an argument against permitting parents to
sue for loss of consortium of their negligently injured twenty-eight
year-old son. It found the rule limiting the cause of action to
minor children, "premised on the rationale that upon emancipation,
parents are no longer entitled to the services and earnings of their
children," both "outmoded and illogical."'72 The court, citing with
approval the reasoning of the Arizona Supreme Court in Howard
Frank and noting that there was no arbitrary age limit in Hawaii's
wrongful death statute, held that parents may sue for loss of an
adult child's consortium.73
66. Id. at 959 (quoting Dwork, supra note 16, at 732).
67. Id. at 960; accord Masaki v. General Motors, 780 P.2d 566 (Hawaii 1989).
68. Howard Frank, 722 P.2d at 960.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 961.
71. 780 P.2d 566 (Hawaii 1989).
72. Id. at 577.
73. Id. at 577-78. The federal district court of Hawaii subsequently concluded
as a matter of Hawaii law that a child could sue for loss of a parent's consortium
in Marquardt v. United Airlines, 781 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Hawaii 1992), and imposed
no age restriction based on the Hawaii Supreme Court's reasoning in Masaki.
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In the context of the child's cause of action, the Washington
Supreme Court refused, in Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co.,74 to
limit to minor children recovery for loss of parental consortium.
Even though the children involved in the action were minors, the
court saw no reason to limit loss of parental consortium to minor
children: "[a]lthough minors are the group most likely to suffer
real harm due to a disruption of the parent-child relationship, we
leave this to the jury to consider in fixing damages."'75  The
Ueland court's approach is persuasive. The level of damages
suffered by adult children is exactly the type of common-sense
determination for which juries are well equipped. In some cases
there will be a strong emotional bond evidenced by mutual caring
and love between the parent and adult child and in some cases
there will not. But this should be a jury determination; recovery
should not be precluded as a matter of law.
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court in Audubon-Exira Ready
Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad6 declined to limit
damages for loss of consortium to the child's minority. As has
been noted, the court stated that even adult children should have
the right to expect the society and guidance of their parents.'
The court further concluded that "[t]he finder of fact should be
able to evaluate the extent of the children's loss of parental
consortium. The loss will normally be less as the child gets older;
but it is not a matter to be decided solely on the basis of the
child's date of birth."78 Based on this reasoning, the Iowa court,
in Nelson v. Ludovissey,79 permitted adult children to maintain a
cause of action. The court made the children's claims subject to
the requirement that parents must bring the claim in the child's
name if not impracticable."
In Hibpshman, the Alaska Supreme Court used reasoning
similar to that applied in Ueland and Audubon-Exira when it
74. 691 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1984).
75. Id. at 195; accord Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 465-66 (Tex. 1991)
(adult or minor children may recover for the loss of a parent's consortium); Nelson
v. Ludovissey, 368 N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 1985) (adult child may assert loss of parental
consortium claim if parent does not bring child's claim); Berger v. Weber, 303
N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981) (no explicit age limitation).
76. 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983).
77. See supra text accompanying note 7.
78. Audobon-Exira Ready Mix, 335 N.W.2d at 152.
79. 368 N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 1985).
80. Id. at 146.
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refused to limit the child's cause of action for loss of parental
consortium to cases of severe injury."' The court stated: "[T]he
amount of loss of consortium damages will reflect the degree of the
child's loss."'  Consequently, a jury should determine the amount
of damages based on the extent of the injury to the child. Just as
the jury should not be precluded from determining loss of consor-
tium damages where the injury is not severe, so too should the jury
not be precluded where the child is an adult.
The Texas Supreme Court, in Reagan v. Vaughn,' also
declined to limit to minors the child's cause of action for loss of
parental consortium. The court cited with approval the reasoning
of the courts in Ueland and Audobon-Exira.' Moreover, the
court determined that it would be "[c]onsistent with our prior
recognition that adult children may recover for the wrongful death
of a parent" to extend the loss of parental consortium action to
adult childrenY As will be seen in the next section of this note,
a similar conclusion can be drawn from Alaska's wrongful death
statute.
C. Alaska's Wrongful Death Statute
Support for extending recovery for loss of filial consortium to
adult children comes not only from the reasoning applied in the
decisions of other state courts but also from Alaska's wrongful
death statute.' The Alaska statute imposes no age requirement
to sue for wrongful death damagesY7 Subsection (a) of Alaska
81. See supra notes 28, 31-34 and accompanying text.
82. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 994 n.10 (Alaska
1987).
83. 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1990).
84. Id. at 466.
85. Id.
86. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1994).
87. The Alaska wrongful death statute provides in part:
(a) [W]hen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may
maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have
maintained an action, had the person lived, against the latter for an
injury done by the same act or omission.... The amount recovered, if
any, shall be exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's spouse and
children when the decedent is survived by a spouse or children, or other
dependents.
(c) In fixing the amount of damages to be awarded under this section,
the court or jury shall consider all the facts and circumstances and from
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Statutes section 09.55.580 includes as beneficiaries children without
regard to age. Moreover, subsection (c)(4) gives those children the
right to sue for loss of consortium.
The Alaska Supreme Court implicitly recognized that adult
children may recover under the statute in Horsford v. Estate of
Horsford."s The court declined to adopt the appellants' theory
that damages under the statute should be apportioned according to
the rules of intestate succession. The court noted that under the
appellants' theory, "[a] totally dependent widow who has suffered
great loss by the death of her husband and a totally independent
adult child who has suffered no loss, would share equally." 9
It is true that the Horsford court approved a formula whereby
pecuniary losses under the wrongful death statute would be limited
to the child's minority, despite the language of subsection (c)(1),
which awards pecuniary losses to the statutory beneficiaries
"without regard to the age thereof '" Arguably, this could be
taken as supporting a limitation to minors of a child's cause of
action for loss of parental consortium in injury cases. However,
this argument fails for two reasons. First, the court expressly
limited its approval of the formula to the facts before it.9 In any
event, the court stressed that, "if there is evidence of circumstances
indicating a longer period of dependency or evidence furnishing a
basis for finding a continued expectation of pecuniary contributions
them fix the award at a sum which will fairly compensate for the injury
resulting from the death. In determining the amount of the award, the
court or jury shall consider but is not limited to the following:
(1) deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits to the
bepeficiary or beneficiaries, without regard to age thereof, that would
have resulted from the continued life of the deceased and without regard
to probable accumulations or what the deceased may have saved during
the lifetime of the deceased;
(2) loss of contributions for support;
3) loss of assistance or services irrespective of age or relationship of
decedent to the beneficiary or beneficiaries;
(4) loss of consortium;
(5) loss of prospective training and education;
(6) medical and funeral expenses.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(a), (c) (1994) (emphasis added). For a complete
history and analysis of the wrongful death statute, see Millard F. Ingraham,
Damages for Wrongful Death in Alaska, 5 ALAsKA L. REv. 293 (1988).
88. 561 P.2d 722 (Alaska 1977).
89. Id. at 727 n.10 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 727-28.
91. Id.
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beyond the age of majority, then the formula can be adjusted or,
if necessary, abandoned."'
Second, the court approved the formula limiting losses to the
children's minority because "the reasonable expectations of a child
for pecuniary contributions from his parents terminates under
ordinary circumstances at about [the age of majority]."'93 Howev-
er, no such expectation is supportable with consortium damages
because parents and children can reasonably expect to enjoy the
benefits of each other's society for their lifetimes. In addition, if
the legislature chose not to impose an age restriction on pecuniary
losses, which can be expected to terminate at majority, certainly no
age restriction should be applied to loss of consortium damages
that do not have a similar expectation.
As has been seen, Alaska's wrongful death statute was one of
the bases by which the Hibpshman court recognized the minor
child's cause of action for loss of parental consortium.94 Clearly,
if the legislature imposes no restriction on adult children's ability
to sue for loss of consortium under the wrongful death statute, it is
illogical to limit the loss of consortium action in negligent injury
cases to minor children.
On the other hand, Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010, which is
the mechanism by which the Alaska Supreme Court permitted
parents to sue for loss of their child's consortium in Gillispie,
specifically states that the parent may only maintain the cause of
action for a child "below the age of majority."'95 This limitation
clearly reflects the master-servant origins of the statute. The
Alaska Supreme Court specifically rejected these origins when it
permitted parents to sue for loss of a child's society: "[A] parent's
action for injury or death of a child can no longer justly be limited
to its master servant origins. Thus we conclude that a parent's
right of action under [section] 09.15.010 includes the right to
recover loss of society damages."96
Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize that the age
limitation is likewise grounded in the statute's master-servant
origins. The court should recognize the flaw in its reasoning and
either repudiate Gillispie to the extent it relies on section 09.15.010
92. Id. at 728.
93. Id.
94. See supra text accompanying note 32.
95. ALASKA STAT. § 09.15.010 (1994).
96. Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1273-74 (Alaska 1992).
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or hold that the limitation to minor children in the statute is
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 7
D. Arguments Against Breaking the Age Barrier
Arguments similar to those used against recognizing loss of
consortium claims in the first instance will probably be used to
support rejecting the extension of filial consortium actions to adult
children: namely, that litigation will increase, money damages will
be inadequate, insurance costs will rise and defendants will be
subjected to multiple claims. As to the first argument, the
Michigan Supreme Court cogently stated that "the rights of a new
class of tort plaintiffs should be forthrightly judged on their own
merits, rather than engaging in gloomy speculation as to where it
will all end.""8 The Arizona Supreme Court also rejected fears of
litigation, likening such fears to "the fabled cry of wolf" that often
prove groundless.9 Even if litigation should increase, the court
noted that "'the existence of a multitude of claims merely shows
society's pressing need for ... redress [of filial consortium
damages]."'
The alleged inadequacy of money damages has likewise been
rejected by courts that have adopted filial consortium claims. In
Theama by Bichler v. City of Kenosha,'0 ' for example, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court stated:
Although a monetary award may be a poor substitute for the
loss of a parent's society and companionship, it is the only
workable way that our legal system has found to ease the injured
party's tragic loss. We recognize this as a shortcoming of our
society, yet we believe that allowing such an award is clearly
preferable to completely denying recovery." z
Moreover, the damage award could be used to obtain psychiatric
treatment to help parents and adult children cope with their losses.
In any event, such an award will help offset the impact of the
loss.1°3
97. See discussion infra part IV.B.
98. Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. 1981) (citation omitted).
99. Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 960 (Ariz.
1986) (citation omitted).
100. Id. (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 n.3 (1968)).
101. 344 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1984).
102. Id. at 520.
103. See Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 194 (Wash. 1984).
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The alleged speculative nature of the loss has also been
rejected as a bar to recovery. Juries are often called upon to assess
intangible injuries, including pain and suffering. As the Alaska
Supreme Court noted in Hibpshman, "[w]e see no reason to
consider the calculation of damages for a child's loss of parental
consortium any more speculative or difficult than that necessary in
other consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress, or pain and
suffering actions.""
The Alaska Supreme Court also rejected the third argu-
ment-that insurance costs will rise-in Hibpshman: "a person's
liability in our law still remains the same whether or not he has
liability insurance; properly, the provision and cost of such
insurance varies with potential liability under the law, not the law
with the cost of insurance."' 05' The last argument-that defen-
dants will be exposed to multiple claims-is easily disposed of by
requiring joinder where feasible. The Alaska Supreme Court
required joinder for minor children in Hibpshman as a "practical
and fair solution to the problem [of multiple claims]."'"
It may also be argued that if filial consortium claims involving
adult children are recognized, disruptions to other relationships,
such as between grandparent and grandchild, should also be
recognized, thus exposing defendants to unlimited liability.
However, this argument lacks merit because "the parent-child
relationship is undeniably unique and the wellspring from which
other family relationships derive. It is the parent-child relationship
which most deserves protection and which, in fact, has received
judicial protection in the past."'"17 Parents and children exhibit
greater emotional dependency than more distant relationships. As
one commentator has suggested:
The distinction between the interests of children and those of
other relatives is rational and easily applied. Most children are
dependent on their parents for emotional sustenance. This is
rarely the case with more remote relatives. Thus, by limiting the
plaintiffs in the consortium action to the victim's children, the
104. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 996 (Alaska 1987).
105. 1d. at 997 (quoting Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652
P.2d 318, 323 (Or. 1982)).
106. Id.
107. Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 956 n.3 (Ariz.
1986).
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courts would ensure that the losses compensated would be both
real and severe.'
The social scientific literature proves this point. Moreover, as the
same author noted, the courts have "demonstrated [their] ability to
draw lines in order to protect a particular interest without leaving
the defendant open to unlimited liability.' 109
In addition, rejecting an arbitrary age distinction simply
increases the number of potential plaintiffs within that relationship;
it does not extend it to others. Furthermore, it is not a valid
argument to deny recovery for a recognized injury merely because
others in the future may wish to assert similar claims. Those claims
should be decided on the merits when the occasion arises."'
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The master-servant analogy with the parent-child relationship
is "long overdue for judicial burial,""' and the Alaska Supreme
Court should see to it that it is permanently interred. An outdated
master-servant analogy that cuts off recovery at age eighteen has
no place in loss of filial consortium claims. Rather, it is the injury
to the "relation""' and the expectations of the parties to each
other's society and companionship that should be compensated.
A. Extending the Child's Cause of Action
There would be no difficulty for the Alaska Supreme Court to
extend to adult children the child's cause of action for loss of
parental consortium. As the court noted in Hibpshman, "loss of
consortium has been repeatedly recognized as a cause of action
created and developed by the courts.""' Thus, it can be judicially
altered. As the court explained in Kaatz v. State,"' "a rule which
is judicial in origin can be, and appropriately should be, altered by
the institution which was its creator.""' Indeed, courts have a
duty to change the common law to meet existing social conditions.
108. Dwork, supra note 16, at 738.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Mich. 1981) ("The need
for and extent of limitations beyond those attendant upon the comparable cause
of action by a spouse should await demonstration.").
111. Howard Frank, 722 P.2d at 960.
112. Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 465 (Alaska 1974).
113. Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 995 (Alaska 1987).
114. 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
115. Id. at 1049.
[Vol. 12:1
BREAKING THE AGE BARRIER
The Hibpshman court stated: "We have long recognized our
responsibility to adapt the common law to the needs of society as
justice requires where the legislature has not spoken."116
B. Extending the Parent's Cause of Action
Extending the parent's cause of action to cover adult children
is rendered problematic by the court's decision in Gillispie to base
the parent's loss of consortium claim on Alaska Statutes section
09.15.010," 7 which specifically limits the parent's cause of action
for the injury of a child below the age of majority."'
The court could simply repudiate Gillispie insofar as it rests the
parent's cause of action on section 09.15.010 and follow the
reasoning stated in the concurring opinion of Justice Rabinowitz.
As discussed above, Justice Rabinowitz would have held as a
matter of common law interpretation, "rather than attempting to
resuscitate [Alaska Statutes] 09.15.010,"119 that parents have a
cause of action for loss of a child's society. He cited with approval
the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit in Scott v. United States:
Following Alaska law and based on the reasoning of the
Hibpshman case, the district court could reasonably have
concluded that a parent's claim for damage to the parent-child
relationship is not sufficiently distinguishable from spousal or
children's consortium claims to warrant nonrecognition. 120
Even the majority in Gillispie noted that holding that a parent did
not have a cause of action for loss of a minor child's consortium
would run counter to the court's precedents in Hibpshman and
Schreiner.2' Nevertheless, the Gillispie court insisted that section
09.15.010 was the "appropriate vehicle" for recognizing the parents'
cause of action.'"
116. 734 P.2d at 995.
117. See Gillispie v. Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272 (Alaska 1992).
118. See supra text accompanying note 95.
119. 842 P.2d at 1274 (Rabinowitz, CJ., concurring).
120. Id. at 1282 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring) (quoting Scott v. United States,
884 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1989)). It is notable that the Ninth Circuit did not
limit the parent's cause of action to minor children when interpreting Alaska law.
884 F.2d at 1288.
121. Gillispie, 842 P.2d at 1274 ("To now hold that a parent is not entitled to
recover loss of society for the death of his or her child would run counter to this
line of precedent [in Schreiner and Hibpshman].").
122. Id.
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Basing the parent's cause of action on the common law of
Alaska would permit the court to amend the law to cover adult
children in spite of the wording of the statute. The inclusion of
adult children would logically follow from the court's precedents in
Hibpshman and Schreiner. Moreover, this approach would be
consistent with the court's ruling in Kavorkian, where the court
imposed no age restriction when the bystander parent sues for
negligent infliction of emotional distress."
Alternatively, the court could simply invalidate the minority
limitation of section 09.15.010 on equal protection grounds. The
United States Supreme Court, in Levy v. Louisiana,24 rejected
the constitutionality of Louisiana's wrongful death statute. As
construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the statute excluded
recovery by illegitimate children for the death of their mother.
Applying rational basis review, the Court determined that the
restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution."z The Court stated:
The rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relation-
ship between a child and his own mother. When the child's
claim of damage for loss of his mother is in issue, why, in terms
of "equal protection," should the tortfeasors go free merely
because the child is illegitimate? Why should the illegitimate
child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of
wedlock?"
By analogy, in the filial consortium context, the Alaska
Supreme Court should similarly apply rational basis review. It
should ask the question posed by the Arizona Supreme Court in
Howard Frank, M.D., PC. v. Superior Court- "Why should the
parents of an injured seventeen-year-old be allowed to recover for
loss of consortium, but not the parents of an injured eighteen-year-
old? '' "V The Arizona court answered the question by saying
"[w]e can divine no adequate answer based on law or logic.""
Certainly a restriction not based on law or logic has no rational
basis. If the Alaska Supreme Court chooses not to repudiate
Gillispie, it should conclude that confining filial consortium claims
123. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
124. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
125. Id. at 72.
126. Id. at 71.
127. 722 P.2d at 961.
128. Md
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to minors has no rational basis and strike down the age restriction
in Alaska Statutes section 09.15.010 as unconstitutional.
Julian E. Hammar

